OODA Loop

For better and faster decisions in conflict

(This post was first published on 28 February 2025 on my Intelligence-Led Activism substack site)

In a nutshell

• OODA Loop is a model of decision-making in conflict.
• Better and faster decisions can allow a weaker side to outsmart a powerful rival.
• The OODA Loop models decisions by defining a repetitive process with four components:
  • Observation (getting information about what’s going on)
  • Orientation (understanding the implications)
  • Decision
  • Action (enacting the decision and changing reality)
• This model allows activists to make faster and more responsive decisions.
• Better, faster decisions help activists successfully confront the powers that be.

What is the OODA Loop?

OODA (pronounced as a two-syllable word, ‘oo-dah’, emphasis on the first syllable) stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. It is a model that helps think about, and improve, decision making in conflict.

US fighter pilot John Boyd originally conceived the OODA Loop to analyse and improve fighter pilot performance. He subsequently went on to elaborate the model to capture the essence of human cognition and culture. He failed. The model is at its most useful when kept simple and specifically applied to its “native” context of decision making in contest.

Let’s consider a dogfight in the mid-twentieth century. Enemy aircraft locked in battle. Split-second decisions will mean the difference between life and death. Pilots seek to capture an advantageous position from which they can shoot down their opponents, while avoiding a position from which they will be shot down. Pilots need to think fast and quickly adapt to a rapidly changing environment, while considering a whole range of factors – their aircraft height and speed, manoeuvrability and capabilities, the state of their fuel and munitions, the surrounding weather, and obviously, the actions and dispositions of their adversary.

The outcome of such dogfights depends to some extent on the different aircraft and technology used, but also to a large extent on the effectiveness of the pilots’ instant decisions in a fast-changing situation. In fact, decision-making advantage will help make up for a technical disadvantage. This is an important point for activists who normally challenge more powerful adversaries.

The model is a bit simple, maybe even trivial, isn’t it?

Simple. Yes. Not trivial. And simplicity is both the model’s limit and its advantage.

The model directs you to consider how you learn about the evolving conditions in which you operate, how you work out what your adversary is doing, how you identify what your options are, how you decide, and how you move to implement your decision. It directs you to think how well these different components hang together and how fast you can go through them.

The model does not provide answers, only a set of considerations. The model does not specify how to make a good observation or how to orient effectively. But it makes us ask ourselves how we observe and orient, and, how we can do it better. In essence, the model defines the components of decision making – Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action – their interactions, and the conditions for success.

Observation is the collection of information about a given situation – the situational awareness, as it were. Orientation is the analysis, making sense of the information. In other words, situational understanding. Contrary to Boyd’s formulation, Observation does not precede Orientation. Instead, Orientation drives Observation. What we need to know should inform what we are looking for and what we are looking at.

That leads to the Decision. Decisions should be quick and effective. Often speed and quality are contradictory. Harried decisions are rarely the best decisions. This opens a set of dilemmas, some quite unique to activists. For example, participatory frameworks of decision-making help ensure contribution from diverse perspectives and might guarantee effectiveness. But they are slow. Leaving decisions to individuals or small groups may expedite things, but may result in poor, biased choices. Again here, the model does not give answers, but rather outlines a set of considerations. Speed, for example, is good. Faster is better than slower. But at what cost in terms of effectiveness?

And finally, Action. Beyond the question of control of action – not covered by the OODA Loop model – the Action also generates new information for Observation. What are the effects, are things developing as intended? Are there corrections needed?

Does the OODA Loop really make a difference?

Not only does it make a difference, it is a particularly important resource for activists.

The OODA Loop captures the basis of the art of outmanoeuvring an opponent. And when your opponent is better resourced and better positioned, there is not much else you can use.

It’s a bit like disruptive startups in the business world, where it is truism that startups’ agility gives them a competitive edge over established corporations. What is that agility? It is the capacity to avoid bureaucratic delays and distortions and make informed decisions quickly and effectively.

OK. So how do I use the OODA Loop?

Use the model to think how you make decisions in an evolving situation, and how you can do better. And you might want to ask yourself how your adversaries are making their decisions. Your OODA Loop must be better and faster than theirs. You want to operate within your adversaries’ OODA loop.

The first thing you might want to do is work out how you and your group members actually make different types of decisions in different contexts. Think of specific examples and try to isolate how information was discovered, who and how defined the situation, how decisions were made, and how they were enacted. And did it all work?

You might then want to project to future events and key junctures and think if you are happy with how decisions are made, or if you need to make any adjustments.

Remember, effective OODA Loops do not happen spontaneously. They require planning and development.

For example, if you operate in a country where civil liberties are curtailed, and are on the cusp of a forceful shutdown by the powers that be. Is someone monitoring signs for an imminent crackdown on your organisation and the criminalisation of your activities? Are you preparing for possible developments so that you can decide fast and well if a crisis should happen? Do you and your group need to have a plan B ready? Will you cease? Will you go underground? How will you decide and communicate the decisions to all involved? And then what?

When it’s the seconds that count, you don’t want to take minutes to evaluate and decide. Fighter pilots spend a lot of time mastering these decisions in training so that they can make them as best as possible in real time. Their lives depend on these decisions. How vital will your decisions be?

Importantly, decision advantage is not only about improving your own OODA Loop. You will also gain an advantage by degrading your opponents’ at the right time and the right place. Think deception. Think surprise attack. Think sabotaging command and control systems.

The bad news is that your adversaries, especially if they are state actors or established vigilantes, know this as well. Could they be targeting your OODA Loop right now?

Where can I find more information?

John Boyd was the master of slides, but did not write much. He summarised his theory of the OODA Loop in five slides under the title of The Essence of Winning and Losing. Boyd’s slides were a living document, and there are a couple of versions circulating online. Unfortunately, the slides will not help much on their own. They were designed to accompany Boyd’s presentation and are quite cryptic on their own. But, if you are a fan of original artifacts, you can get the slides online at various locations like this one, and this one.

If you love deep dives into new topics, you can start with Frans Osinga’s book, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, available for sale as well as for free as a PDF on various sites including this one.

Both Google and Google Scholar are good places to search for research papers. Discussions in military and strategic studies circles are often insightful. Activists would probably benefit from discussions of OODA Loops in asymmetrical conflicts in insurgencies and in terrorism. These tend to focus more on how the OODA Loop can help overcome power disadvantage in a direct contest.

Your Google search will also yield plenty of vendor websites flogging decision-making advice to businesses. I have not found them to be useful at all.